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NOTES AND COMMENTS

For closed years, if any are involved, it would seem that the husband's possibility of redress is only that available through mitigation
of the statute of limitations. 35
While Lester creates some problems of hardship, the benefits of
simplicity of interpretation and certainty of tax consequences are
much to be desired in applying the federal revenue laws. The decision has also settled a confusing conflict of circuit court authority
in construing property settlement agreements containing contingent
reduction provisions in the event of death or remarriage of the wife,
death of the husband, or because minor.children become of age, die,
or marry. These factors may justify the triumph of form over substance in this instance,but no extension of that approach is advocated,
either in the federal tax field or other branches of the law.86
MARION A. COWELL, JR.
Federal Income Taxation-Leases-Amortization of Ground Rents
Not infrequently a taxpayer will purchase real property subject to
an outstanding lease. In many instances the lessee will have erected
improvements on the leased land. By virtue of having made a capital
investment in those improvements and avowedly retaining ownership of them until the termination of the lease, the lessee is entitled
to an annual depreciation deduction.' In cases where both these fac"' In cases where the parties are "related taxpayers" under the statute, for
instance when the wife is beneficiary under an alimony trust, there appear to
be possibilities of mitigation. Eleanor B. Burton, 1 T.C. 1198 (1943);
Katharine C. Ketcham, 2 T.C. 159 (1943), aff'd, 142 F.2d 996 (2d Cir.
1944); INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 1311-1314. See generally 2 MERTENS,
FEDERAL INCoME TAXATION ch. 14 (rev. 1961) ; Scheifly, The Operation of
Sections 1311-1314, 13 U. So. CAL.. 1961 TAX INST. 509; Annot., 54 A.L.R.2d
538 (1957).
The doctrine of res judicata applies to tax litigation when the case concerns the same issue for the same tax year, while for subsequent years the
doctrine of collateral estoppel applies. Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S.
591 (1948); Tait v.' Western Md. Ry., 289 U.S. 620 (1933). See generally
10 MERTENS, FEDERAL INCOMmE' TAXATION ch. 60 (rev. 1958); Griswold,
Res .udicata in Federal Tax Cases, 46 YALE L.J. 1320 (1936-37); Arinot.,

92 L.ED. 913 (1948).
" No cases have been found construing the applicable North Carolina
statutes. However, since the laws are extremely similar, especially in the
provisions relating to deduetibility of child support payments, the need for
clarity, certainty, and conformity in the construction and application of
revenue laws, both state a d federal; should lead the courts of North Carolina to adopt the rule in Lester. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 105-141 (a), -141.2,
-147(21) (1958).
'Duffy v. Central R.R. of N.J., 268 U.S. 55 (1925); Hotel Kingkade v.
Commissioner, 180 F.2d 310 (10th Cir. 1950).
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tors are present the purchase price, which is unavoidably determined
to some extent by the ground rent' yielded by the outstanding lease,
may well reflect a premium over what would be paid for a similar
tract of land without a favorable lease.' Has the purchaser in such
event acquired only non-depreciable land, or has he acquired in addition a wasting asset 4 in the right to receive future ground rent? If
the wasting asset is part of his investment will he be able to amortize,
over the unexpired term of the lease, that portion of the purchase
price attributable to this right?
In World Publishing Co. v. Commissioner" the Eighth Circuit
held that the taxpayer acquired a wasting asset in these ground rents,
and would be allowed to amortize, over the remaining life of the lease,
that portion of the purchase price allocable to this wasting asset.
There the taxpayer bought land which the vendor-lessor had leased
for a term of fifty years for an annual rental of $28,500. At the time
of the purchase there were twenty-eight years remaining in the term.
The purchaser paid $700,000 for the land and outstanding lease. He
contended that the difference between the total purchase price and
the fair market value of the land was paid for the right to receive
future rentals ;6 since this was a wasting asset, he should be allowed
2The phrase 'ground rent' or 'ground rentals' means the money received
under a lease for the use of the land alone. This term as used in this note
is to be distinguished from the term ground rent as used in Maryland, Pennsylvania, and Michigan meaning an interest in land. A typical example of a
Maryland, Pennsylvania, or Michigan ground rent is where A conveys to B
and his heirs and assigns in fee simple, with the provision that B and his heirs
and assigns pay annual rent forever to the grantor, his heirs and assigns.
Pronzato v. Guerrina, 400 Pa. 521, 524 n.1, 163 A.2d 297, 298 n.1 (1960).
Ground rent, as an interest in land, is distinct and separate from the land out
of which it issues. Marburg v. Mercantile Bldg. Co., 154 Md. 438, 442, 140
Atl. 836, 838-39 (1928).
'A favorable lease is one in which the reserved rentals are greater than
the rentals which could be obtained currently on the same premises. Conversely, in an unfavorable lease the reserved rentals are less than the rentals
which could have been obtained if the purchaser were in a position to lease
the property to another in the current market. See Rubin, Depreciationof
Property PurchasedSubject ta a Lease, 65 HARV. L. REv. 1134 (1952).
"A wasting asset is intangible property, as compared with depreciable,
tangible property, which is characterized by a progressive loss of value
extending over a series of taxable years. Due to the passage of time, a
wasting asset will eventually become worthless, either because it stops producing income, as does a patent, or the very thing ceases tb exist, as does the
right to receive rent in the principal case. See 512 W. Fifty-Sixth St. Corp.
v. Commissioner, 151 F.2d 942, 944 (2d Cir. 1945).
'299 F.2d 614 (8th Cir. 1962).
o Here the fair market value of the land was $400,000. The difference
of $300,000 is the amount attributable to the right to receive ground rents.
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to amortize or depreciate7 the difference over the remaining life of
the lease.8
The question of whether one, who acquired land subject to an outstanding lease, had the right to amortize, first arose where the taxpayer was an heir or devisee of the lessor. In such a situation the
courts have repeatedly denied the heir or devisee the right to amortize or depreciate.
The courts reasoned that since neither the devisor nor devisee had any capital investment in the leasehold, there
was no depreciable interest which could be acquired by the devisee.10
Commissioner v. Moore,'1 involving a devise of property subject
to an outstanding lease, was the first case to allow amortization of
7

While depreciation and amortization are basically the same, there is the
distinction that the former applies to tangible property and the latter to
intangible property. Since rentals are intangible, amortization is the proper
designation for the deduction allowance. It should be noted that throughout
the opinion in World Publishing, the court makes no distinction between
amortization and depreciation. While both are methods which enable the
taxpayer to recover his investment, depreciation allows a more rapid writeoff in the earlier years. Amortization over the life of the property is in
effect a form of depreciation known as the straight line method. That is,
the same amount is deducted each year. See Treas. Regs. § 1.167(b)-i
(1962). But there is another method of depreciation called the declining
balance which allows for the first year a 150% deduction of the applicable
straight line rate. See Treas. Regs. § 1.167(b)-2 (1962). For example,
under the straight line method, if the first year's deduction was $100 for
property with an adjusted basis of $1000 and a useful life of 10 years, then
the deduction under the declining balance method for the first year would
be $150. In three years the deduction allowed under the former method
would be (3 X $100) = $300, while under the latter method it would be
. $385.88. This allowance of 150% of the straight line rate is applicable to
new or used property acquired after December 31, 1953. Rev. Rul. 60-8,
1960-1 Cum. BULL. 113; Rev. Rul. 57-352, 1957-2 Cum. BULL. 150.
' INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 167(a) provides as a depreciation deduction,

an allowance for the exhaustion, wear and tear (including a reasonable
allowance for obsolescence of property held for the production of income.)
' See, e.g., Schubert v. Commissioner, 286 F.2d 573 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
366 U.S. 960 (1961) ; Goelet v. United States, 266 F.2d 881 (2d Cir. 1959) ;
First Nat'l Bank v. Nee, 190 F.2d 61 (8th Cir. 1951); Commissioner v.
Pearson, 188 F.2d 72 (5th Cir. 1951); Friend v. Commissioner, 119 F.2d
959 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 673 (1941).
" The general situation with the heir or devisee was that he acquired the
real property or an interest in it which was subject to an outstanding lease.
He contended that since the estate tax valuation of the property and lease
operated to furnish a new basis for determining gain or loss from the sale
or other disposition of the property, and to the extent that depreciable property entered into it, for the depreciation of the property, then he should be
allowed a basis for depreciation of the property he acquired. The court rejected this reasoning by saying unless the property is depreciable, the statutory provisions providing a basis for depreciation are irrelevant. These
provisions only provide a basis upon which depreciation is to be computed
and does not create or amplify depreciability. First National Bank v. Nee,
supra note 9, at 64; Schubert v. Commissioner, supra note 9, at 579.
11207 F.2d 265 (9th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 942 (1954).
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the right to receive ground, rents-limited, however, to the premium."2 In Moore the court's decision reflected the true contentions
of the taxpayer; that is, he was not trying to depreciate or amortize
the improvements built by the lessee, but rather his interest in the
rentals.' 'In World Publishingthere is'the factual difference, which
Friend v. Commissioner'4- intimated* might result in allowing the
taxpayer to amortize, that the taxpayer 'invested money in what he
considered to be income producing property.
The commissioner based his attack on the fact that the purchaser
in World Publishingacquired only what the original lessor had, and
this had not included any depreciable interest in the lessee-constructed
building.-" In support of this argument he relied on the inheritance
"Z
There is no real difference in the premium approach and the valuation
approach used in the principal case. Using the valuation approach, the taxpayer is allowed to amortize the difference between the total purchase price
and the fair market value of the land. With the premium approach the
amortizable deduction is that amount, in excess of the value of the land,
which a purchaser would be willing to pay to get a return equal to the amount
of the existing rentals.
Under the valuation approach, the amount to be amortized is easily ascertained by subtracting the fair market value of the land from the total purchase price. That figure is $300,000. Since he paid $700,000 to get a return
of $28,500 a year, the rate of return is about 4%. Since the premium could
be calculated by comparing the capitalized value of the future rentals for the
remaining years under the lease, as it existed when the heir or devisee ac-

quired the property, with the capitalized value of an identical lease made

presently, the question is what amount in addition to the value of the land
would a purchaser pay to receive $28,500 annually? Based on a 4% return,
this can be calculated as follows: 4% X Total Price-= $28,500. This figure is
again $700,000. Since the value of the land was $400,000, the additional
amount is what the purchaser would pay, and is the amount allowed to be
amortized.
1
The taxpayer in Friend v. Commissioner, 119 F.2d 959 (7th Cir. 1941),
made the same contention. But there the court said to be entitled to depreciation or amortization the taxpayer must have made an investment in the
leasehold, and, since the taxpayer denied. that there had been any cost to
the estate in the acquisition of these leases, there can be no loss to be recovered
by amortization or depreciation.
The right to receive rent for twenty-eight years in World Publishing is
analogous to patents or copyrights. With a patent which has a finite life
of seventeen years, a taxpayer, should he buy the patent, would enjoy the
income it produces for all seventeen years. In Buckwalter v. Commissioner,
61 F.2d 571 (6th Cir. 1932), it was held'that a patent is a wasting asset
which may be amortized over its-life where it is used in the taxpayer's trade
or business or when it is held for the production of income. After this
time the patent would be worthless. In World Publishing,assuming the value
of the land remained stable, at the end of the lease the property would only
be worth $400,000. Here the passage of time not only eliminates further
income-it reduces the value of the investment.
,119 F.2d 959 (7th Cir. 1941).

1

The lower courts properly agreed -with the commissioner that the heir
or devisee had no present depreciable interest in the building or other im-
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cases which held that neither the decedent nor his successor has any
interest in the leasehold. In Schubert v. Commissionwr,0 it, was
held that an heir or devisee cannot acquire a larger interest than
that of the decedent. The court in World Publishing rejected this
argument on grounds that it is illogical to allow a purchaser to.depreciate where the vendor-lessor is the builder, but to deny the purchaser the deduction where the lessee is the builder. This approach
may result in further confusion, because the purchaser is not trying
to depreciate the improvements themselves, but is instead, seeking
to amortize his investment made for the future ground rentals.
Where the building or other improvements are erected by the lessee
who retains the title until the termination or default of the lease,
notwithstanding the decision in the principal case, the rule remains
that the purchaser (or heir) is not entitled to depreciate these improvements.17 Since the purchaser or heir acquired no interest in
The
the improvements, he is not concerned with their useful life.'
building could be destroyed or condemned long before the expiration
of the lease and still the lessee would have to pay the annual rent for
the full term. Likewise, had there been no improvements made by the
lessee, the result in World Publishingwould have been the same.
In arriving at the amount which the taxpayer is allowed to amortize there is an additional factor to be considered. Should the useful
life of the building exceed or be shorter than the unexpired term of
the lease, the fair market value" of the building at the time of the
provements made by the lessee, but were in error when they concluded that
the devisee had no interest that could be depreciated or amortized. When the
estate was evaluated for estate tax purposes, the capitalized value of the future rentals was included in the gross estate. The devisee had an interest in
the right to receive the rentals.
10286 F.2d 573 (4th Cir. 1961).
Since the taxpayer is amortizing his investment in the right to receive
rentals, and not the improvements made by the lessee, the right to depreciate
them is left to the lessee. In the principal case, the court said: "What is
'T

significant is that each taxpayer .

.

. meets the statutory requirements for

depreciation. To allow each to recover his own, and separate, investment is
not, as is suggested, to permit duplication at the expense of the revenues and
is not to permit one taxpayer to depreciate another's investment. That each
is concerned with the same building is of no relevance." 299 F.2d at 622.
8 Useful life is that period of time during which the depreciable property
will be reasonably useful to the particular taxpayer in his trade or business.
Treas. Regs. § 1.167(a)-1 (b) (1962).
"oThe lessor's interest in the building on the date of surrender is the fair
market value of the building and not its adjusted base. This is especially
true in the case where the life of the lease exceeds the useful life of the
building, because the adjusted base'may vary according to the method of depreciation the lessee employs. See note 8 supra. The determination of the
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termination of the lease must be figured in the total purchase price
in order that the amount to be amortized can be computed. In the
principal case the parties stipulated that the useful life of the building
did not exceed the remaining term of the lease. Since the taxpayer
is trying to arrive at an estimated value of the building for the purpose of computing the amount to be amortized, the fair market value
of the building at the end of the lease will not be sufficient for his
present needs. A building worth so much in the future will not be
worth the same at the present time. To arrive at the correct amount,
it is necessary to know what a building would be worth to a buyer
today when he would be unable to enjoy possession until a later date.
This would be the discount value, and is the amount one would pay
presently for the future right of possession. It is suggested that
the decision should be limited to the extent that the maximum amount
allowed to be amortized should not be greater than the difference
between the total price and the fair market value of the land increased
by the discount value of the building.
The decision in the principal case may affect another issue which
was not raised. If amortization of the wasting asset is correct when
the purchaser buys and retains the ground subject to a lease, what
are the results should he sell or exchange his right to receive future
rentals? In Hort v. Commissioner" a devisee acquired land subject
to an outstanding lease. During a period of depression, he and the
lessee agreed that for a stipulated sum the lessee could surrender the
lease. The Court held that this payment was a substitute for future
rentals, and, as such, was a recognized gain. As a result of the principal case, if the taxpayer is allowed to amortize that portion of the
purchase price allocable to the right to receive future rentals, it would
seem that he could treat the amount received on the sale of this right,
to the extent of its then adjusted basis,21 as a return of capital and
not as gain of any character. Any amount received in excess of the
adjusted basis would be recognized gain.
Should the Supreme Court of the United States eventually apamount of the lessor's interest is necessary in order to compute how much
he will be able to amortize. This is not to be confused with what the lessor's

basis would be, or whether such improvements would be considered as income
or not. INT. REv. CODE oF 1954, § 1019 provides that the basis of the lessor's

real property shall not be increased or diminished by reason of his acquiring
the lessee-made improvements on the termination of the lease.
2-313 U.S. 28 (1941).
2" The adjusted basis for the lessor would be cost of the building minus
depreciation deductions allowed to the lessee. See Treas. Regs. § 1.1011-1
(1962).
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prove the ruling in the principal case, its holding would permanently
lay to rest the commissioner's contention, suggested by Schubert,
that one cannot obtain more rights than one's devisor or vendor had.
As pointed out in World Publishing the problem should be analyzed
on the basis of what the taxpayer has rather than what a prior lessor
may have had. From this point of view World Publishing and
Moore are in accord.
BORDEN R. HALLOWES
Insane Persons-Involuntary Commitment Procedures-Due Process
North Carolina's statutory commitment procedure has been put
together in a piecemeal manner' and does not readily conform to any
pattern of laws applicable in other jurisdictions.2 The General
Assembly, recognizing the special problems concerning care of the
mentally ill, has constantly striven to modernize the old law.' In
what has appeared to be cognizance of this endeavor, the court has
taken judicial notice of the fact that commitment of a mentally ill
person involves a procedure unlike any other.4
For example, in the case of In re Harris,5 the court overruled
previous decisions6 and enlarged the writ of habeas corpus to the
' See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 122-35.1 to -68.1 (1958), as amended, N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 122-36 to -68.1 (Supp. 1961).
For graphic comparisons of all state procedures see LiNDMAN & MCINTYRE, THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 44-106 (1961); Ross, Commitment of the Mentally Ill; Problems of Law and Policy, 57 MICH. L. REv.
945, 1008-16 (1959). Nonconformity by North Carolina is not in itself

damning, for there is little conformity between the states as to any type of
commitment procedure. See LINDMAN & MCINTYRE, supra; Ross, supra.
An attempt to gain uniformity was made in 1950 by the preparation of a
"Draft Act" which was sent to all the state governors as a working model to
be adapted to local needs and conditions. NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF MENTAL
HEALTH, FEDERAL SECURITY AGENCY, A DRAFT ACT GOVERNING HOSPITILIZATION OF THE MENTALLY ILL (Public Health Service Pub. No. 51, 1951).
Approximately ten states have adopted the Draft Act in whole or in part.
Slovenko & Super, Commitment Proceduresin Louisiana,35 TUL. L. REv. 705
n.2 (1961).
'There have been over forty changes since 1958 dealing with mental
health. See N.C. GEN. STAT. ch. 122 (Supp. 1961). Twenty-two of these
deal directly with commitment procedures. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 122-36 to

-91 (Supp. 1961).
'Involuntary commitment proceedings are, strictly speaking, neither a
civil action nor a special proceeding. In re Cook, 218 N.C. 384, 11 S.E.2d
142 (1940). This "creates a problem only in the minds of those who are not

familiar with the distinction between a hospitalization proceeding and a
criminal or civil trial." Whitmore, Comments on a Draft Act for the Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill, 19 GEo. WASH. L. Rxv. 512, 524-25 (1951).
241 N.C. 179, 84 S.E.2d 808 (1954).

E.g., In re Chase, 193 N.C. 450, 137 S.E. 305 (1927).

